Movement on FSDC

MoF press
release on FSDC.

For the background on FSDC, see: the budget
announcement of Feb
2010, a
newspaper column of mine on 16 March,
and a
collection of responses in the media on 20 March.

Does the FSDC amount to clipping RBI's wings?

The FSDC is only a committee. It is not backed by law. So nothing
changes about RBI's role and function.

RBI staff have done speeches saying that financial stability is
their job.

The RBI Act does not contain the word `financial stability'. So
while some in RBI might aspire to such a function, the present role
and function of the RBI does not include financial stability.

The FSDC is not a new law, it's merely a committee, so what
changes? We already had the HLCC. What changes with the FSDC?

The FSDC is intended to have a full-time technical
secretariat which will work on the problems of financial stability
and development. This is something the HLCC lacked. And, the HLCC
was chaired by the RBI Governor. He was unable to resolve three
classes of situations: (a) Differences between two financial
agencies such as the ULIPs question, (b) Differences between two
financial agencies when one of them was RBI and (c) Problems of
financial stability which require system thinking, which no one
Indian agency is good at understanding, given the silo system that
is in place. The FSDC should fare better on all three fronts by
virtue of being chaired by the finance minister (and backed by a
strong secretariat).

So will the FSDC help matters?

It all depends on the staff quality that DEA is able to put into
it. The "strong secretariat" is only an aspiration at the present
moment.

What is the right role for autonomy for an agency external to
MoF?

There are href="http://www.mayin.org/ajayshah/MEDIA/2010/autonomy.html">two
clear areas where autonomy is required. The first is about
specific transactions. As examples, what entities get bank licenses or
exchange licenses? Or, when RBI/SEBI investigate Bank of Rajasthan or
MCX-SX. It is highly desirable for MoF to be completely hands-off on
these kinds of activities of agencies external to MoF. The second is
about monetary policy, i.e. the setting of the short-term interest
rate. For these two areas, there is a strong and clear case for
de-politicisation and autonomy. In other questions, the case for
autonomy is not clear-cut.

So is it okay for MoF to meddle in the decisions of an external
financial agency on subjects like the policy framework for
exchange ownership, or the rules about private bank entry?

The staff quality that DEA is able to put into these functions
is supremely important. It is possible to do this right.

Is FSDC opening a Pandora's box by asking too much of DEA staff quality?

I think it is an attempt in the right direction. Largely speaking,
it is converting the existing de facto arrangements
into de jure with greater formal structure. If FSDC builds up
top quality staff, then it will make progress. Else, it will be
irrelevant and the present will continue mostly unchanged.

There will of course be ups and downs, but when I look back at the
brainpower at DEA from 1993 onwards
I feel optimistic about the expected value of FSDC.

The attempt at
building a team which works on financial stability and development
is an important and a good one. Success on putting together a top
quality team cannot be taken for granted. But at the same time, if
MoF had not tried this, there would have been a certainty that such
a team would not have come together. It is possible to spin this in
a gloomy way, but an oversupply of cynicism can crowd out attempts at
progress.